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  We develop, both theoretically and experimentally, a 
stereotypical environment that allows for coordination breakdown, 
leading to a bank run. Three depositors are located at the nodes of a 
network and have to decide whether to keep their funds deposited or to 
withdraw. One of the depositors has immediate liquidity needs, whereas 
the other two depositors do not. Depositors act sequentially and observe 
others actions only if connected by the network. Theoretically, a link 
connecting the first two depositors to decide is sufficient to avoid a bank 
run. However, our experimental evidence shows that subjects’ choice is 
not affected by the existence of the link per se. Instead, being observed 
and the particular action that is observed determine subjects’ choice. 
Our results highlight the importance of initial decisions in the 
emergence of a bank run. In particular, Bayesian analysis reveals that 
subjects clearly depart from predicted behavior when observing a 
withdrawal.  
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 31 Introduction
Much of the Great Depression￿ s economic damage was caused directly by bank runs (Bernanke 1983). In
2007, the run on Northern Rock in the United Kingdom heralded the oncoming economic crisis. After that,
several banks have been run in developed countries such as the Bank of East Asia in Hong Kong or the
Washington Mutual in the United States of America. Non-bank institutions, like investment funds, have
also experienced massive withdrawals very similar to a bank run. The collapse of Bear Stearns, or the
temporary suspension of redemptions in the real estate investment fund Banif Inmobiliario in Spain are just
two recent examples.
The two polar explanations for the occurrence of bank runs are the worsening of fundamental variables
(e.g., macroeconomic shocks) and coordination failure among depositors.1 Empirical evidence suggests that
bank runs may not be explained merely by changes in the fundamentals a⁄ecting the bank (Calomiris and
Mason, 2003), so coordination problems are an important issue at stake too. The workhorse model of
coordination problem among depositors is that of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). They show, by the way of
a simultaneous-move game, the possibility of multiple equilibria, one of which involves depositors running
the bank. The literature that grew out of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) maintains the simultaneous-move
framework to study the coordination problem. However, description of bank runs (Sprague 1910, Wicker
2001) and statistical data (Starr and Yilmaz 2007) suggest that decisions are not entirely simultaneous, but
are partially sequential. Thus, many depositors have information about what other depositors have done
and use it when making their decisions (Kelly and O Grada 2000, Iyer and Puri 2008).
In game theory, two actions are said to be simultaneous if players are not informed about other players￿
actions. Even though the decisions may be made at di⁄erent points in time, the game is simultaneous
because players make decisions without knowing the actions that are being chosen by others. By contrast,
sequentiality requires information ￿ ow and knowledge of predecessors￿actions.
We build a theoretical model displaying both simultaneity and sequentiality by using networks. Depositors
are the nodes of a network, so that a link connecting two nodes implies that one of the depositors can observe
the others￿actions. As a result, the connected depositors play a sequential game while the depositors who are
not linked play a simultaneous game. We consider two di⁄erent types of depositors and study a three-player
network, which is the smallest network where coordination problems may arise.2 We assume that there is
one impatient depositor who has an immediate need for funds. The other two depositors, who are called
1Gorton and Winton (2003) is a comprehensive survey on ￿nancial intermediation dealing in depth with banking panics.
2Our setup is akin to the existing literature. Green and Lin (2000) analyze the coordination problem with three depositors,
whereas one of the main results in Peck and Shell (2003) involves two depositors.
2patient, do not need their money urgently. Everybody has to decide whether to withdraw her funds from
the bank or keep them deposited. If both of the patient depositors decide to keep the money in the bank,
they will receive a payo⁄ which is higher than the payo⁄ associated with withdrawal. If only one of them
waits, her payo⁄ will be lower than that of withdrawal.3 Depositors decide in sequence as if they were in
the line of a bank. They know their position in the sequence and their type, which is private information.
A depositor observes previous actions depending on whether she has a link to those who have acted before.
Depositors also know if they will be observed by subsequent depositors. We de￿ne a bank run as a situation
in which at least one of the patient depositors withdraws. In this respect, we show that if the ￿rst and the
second depositors are connected, then no bank run is the unique equilibrium. This result is independent of
the types of depositors who are linked. Hence, when the link between the ￿rst two depositors (henceforth,
link 12) is not in place, bank runs may occur in equilibrium. The link 12 represents therefore a su¢ cient
condition to avoid bank runs as it eliminates coordination failure in the network.4
Next, we aim at testing our theoretical prediction in the lab. We match subjects in pairs and let the
computer acting as the impatient depositor. Subjects are aware of this and know that coordination with the
other subject in the lab yields higher payo⁄s. Statistical tests con￿rm partially the theoretical prediction.
The link 12 decreases signi￿cantly the ￿rst depositor￿ s withdrawal rate. Nevertheless, we also see that the
￿rst depositor￿ s behavior is mainly driven by the fact of being observed, rather than by the link 12. It
is the case because the link 13 has also a considerable e⁄ect in reducing the ￿rst depositor￿ s withdrawal
rate. Regarding the second depositor, it turns out that the link 12 is not important in the sense the theory
predicts. We ￿nd that the second depositor cares about what she observes and not about the existence of the
link 12. Thereby, observing a withdrawal increases the probability of withdrawal, while the opposite is true
when she observes a waiting. We undertake a Bayesian analysis to complete our experimental study. The
result con￿rms that the second depositor deviates from equilibrium behavior after observing a withdrawal.
Indeed, her choice can be better explained by random behavior that induces withdrawal with probability
one half.
To our best knowledge, our analysis is the ￿rst to approach the classic bank-run problem using a network
that channels information among depositors. This modeling choice has various advantages. On the one hand,
3We will use to keep the money in the bank and to wait in an interchangeable manner.
4More speci￿cally, the link 12 rules out the possibility of multiple equilibria in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Uniqueness
or multiplicity of equilibria is an important issue in the bank run literature. For instance, contrary to Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) show in a global games setup that both run and no run are possible equilibria, but the
fundamentals determine unambigously which one occurs. Green and Lin (2003) show that a bank can o⁄er a contract that
implements uniquely the e¢ cient outcome.
3it ￿ts the empirical evidence and allows for simultaneity and sequentiality in a natural way. This represents
a novelty in the bank run literature. On the other hand, the use of networks helps to disentangle issues
involving uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibria. More concretely, our theoretical result contributes to this
debate by showing that there are information structures that imply a unique equilibrium without run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next we review the experimental literature on bank runs.
Section 2 provides the theoretical framework we will test, as well as the notation and the main theoretical
result. In section 3, we ￿rst describe our experiment and then we analyze and discuss the empirical results.
Section 4 concludes.
Literature Review
There is a rich literature on coordination games and experimental testing, but only three of the papers involve
a bank run scenario.5 Schotter and Yorulmazer (2008) focus on the dynamic analysis of bank runs and how
di⁄erent factors (e.g., asymmetric information or deposit insurance) in￿ uence the dynamics of withdrawals.
They show the importance of the available information on depositors￿behavior, and more concretely they
￿nd that predictions of the theory are consistent with observed behavior when players have a high level of
information. Madies (2006) studies the possibility of self-ful￿lling bank runs and the e¢ ciency of policy
instruments (suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance) to prevent them. He ￿nds that self-ful￿lling
banking panics are recurrent and persistent phenomena, but banks with su¢ cient liquidity or a full deposit
insurance may curb them. Our paper departs from these studies as their foci are withdrawal dynamics when
a bank run is already underway while our question is how bank runs emerge and what a⁄ects the prevalence
of runs.
The closest paper to ours is Garratt and Keister (2009). They study how two factors (multiple possibilities
to withdraw and forced withdrawals) a⁄ect the existence of bank runs. They ￿nd that in the absence of forced
withdrawals players e⁄ectively coordinate on the good outcome and withdrawals are rare. Nevertheless,
adding forced withdrawals results in high withdrawal rates. They identify the multiple withdrawal possibility
as the culprit of this negative outcome. They claim that more information about other depositors￿decision
may be harmful for coordination when there are still opportunities to withdraw. In this respect, our analysis
5Our analysis relates also to the emerging literature on coordination problems in network. A recent paper in this literature is
Choi et al. (2008) that studies a public good game. Despite di⁄erences in the model there is a striking similarity in the results.
They call strategic commitment the tendency to make contributions early in the game to encourage others to contribute. This
commitment is of strategic value only if it is observed by others. Our ￿nding that the ￿rst depositor is more likely to wait when
observed by any of the subsequent depositors can be seen as case of strategic commitment. Our paper can also be related to
coordination problems in organization. Brandts and Cooper (2006) stress the importance of observability in this context.
4suggests that having more information through more links may enhance the possibility of bank runs if the
impatient depositor is the ￿rst to decide. Otherwise, the link 12 enforces coordination and helps to avoid
bank runs in equilibrium. Garratt and Keister (2009) also show how simple cuto⁄ rules involving Bayesian
updating perform well in explaining observed behavior. Bank runs can then be due to negative beliefs about
how other players will play. We can also derive a similar explanation relying on our Bayesian analysis, which
suggests that depositors may overweigh the probability of observing withdrawal from patient depositors. In
any case, our approach di⁄ers from Garratt and Keister (2009) as we introduce an impatient depositor (the
computer) that withdraws with certainty. Besides, we use networks to channel information and account for
simultaneous and sequential decisions.
2 The Model
Consider three depositors, each of them endowed with e > 0 of monetary units. There is a bank which pools
the endowments at t = 0 and o⁄ers a contract ￿ = (c00;c1;c01;crun) > 0 which speci￿es the depositors￿
payo⁄s depending on two factors: (i) depositors￿choice at t = 1, and (ii) the available funds of the bank.
At the beginning of t = 1 depositors learn their liquidity types and their position in the sequence of
decision (i = 1;2;3). One of the depositors has liquidity needs (impatient depositor), so she cares only
about immediate consumption at t = 1. The other two depositors derive utility from consumption at any
period (patient depositors). Liquidity type and position in the line are assumed to be independent (e.g., the
impatient depositor is not more probable to be at the beginning of the line).
As usual in the literature, depositors are isolated from each other (they cannot trade directly), but
have the opportunity to contact the bank to withdraw their deposit. Since the impatient depositor always
withdraws, we focus our attention on the patient ones. Let ci
1 denote depositor i￿ s payo⁄upon withdrawal at
t = 1 and ci
0 the payo⁄ if she waits at t = 1 for i = 1;2;3. The utility function (u(ci); where ci 2 fci
0;ci
1g) is
strictly increasing and strictly concave. Types are publicly unobservable, but it is common knowledge that
there are two patient and an impatient depositors.
Depositors decide once, according to their position in the line (i). As depositors are called to decide in
t = 1, they may either keep the money in the bank or withdraw it. Notationally, yi 2 f0;1g for i = 1;2;3
stands for the decision of depositor i, where 0 denotes keeping the money, whereas 1 indicates withdrawal.
We de￿ne y￿i 2 Y￿i as the unordered decisions of the other depositors, where Y￿i = (f1;1g;f1;0g).
The payo⁄s are determined as follows. If an depositor decides to withdraw, then she receives immediately
her money from the bank. The payo⁄ upon withdrawal is ci






c1 if y￿i = f1;0g
crun if y￿i = f1;1g
;
where 0 < crun < e < c1: In words, the bank commits to pay c1 to the ￿rst two withdrawing depositors.
Note that the depositor in the third position may be the second withdrawing depositor and in this case
she receives c1. After two withdrawals, if the third depositor also decides to withdraw, then she gets the
remaining funds in the bank (crun = 3e ￿ 2c1) which is less than the initial endowment e.
If a patient depositor decides to keep the money in the bank, then she receives her payo⁄ at t = 2. The
amount of funds the bank has at the end of period 1 will be 3e ￿ c1 or 3e ￿ 2c1, depending on the other
patient depositor￿ s decision. This amount earns a return and then it is split up equally among the depositors






c00 if y￿i = f1;0g
c01 if y￿i = f1;1g
;
where c01 < c00 and in the subscript the ￿rst symbol (0) shows that depositor i waits, while the second
symbol denotes the other patient depositor￿ s decision.
We assume that
c00 > c1 > e > c01 > crun (1)
which allows for coordination problems.
The following graph summarizes the events of our model:
Network, Information and Bank Runs
We use the network to determine the information ￿ ow among depositors. Depositors are set in a social
network. Linked depositors are called neighbors and links are undirected so that information ￿ ows in both
directions. Although types cannot be observed, links allow for observability of neighbors￿actions.
6Links are independent of liquidity types, so depositors of the same liquidity type are not more likely to be
linked. Neither is there any relationship between liquidity type and the number of links. A link is represented
by a pair of numbers which shows the depositors who are connected. Hence, ij (for i;j 2 f1;2;3g, i < j)
denotes a link which connects depositors i and j: For instance, 12 denotes a link between the ￿rst and the
second depositor. A network (￿) is the set of existing links among the depositors. The possible networks are:
(12;23;13), (12;23), (12;13), (13;23), (12), (13), (23), (;), where (;) stands for the empty network which
has no links at all while the structure (12;23;13) contains all the possible links and is called the complete
network.
Whenever two depositors are connected, the second one to act observes the action of the ￿rst one, who
knows that her action is observed. Hence, when it is depositor i￿ s turn to decide, she knows her own type,
her position in the line, the actions of those neighbors who preceded her (yj for j 6= i if j < i and ij 2 ￿)
and whether she will be observed by subsequent neighbors. Notice that the depositors￿information is local,
therefore the network structure is not common knowledge. As a consequence, no depositor knows if the other
two depositors are connected or not.6
A key element of the model is that when the depositors decide, they may not be sure of the payo⁄ they
will receive. For instance, if a patient depositor at the ￿rst position waits, then her payo⁄ depends on what
the other patient depositor does (i.e., c1
0 2 fc00;c01g). Similarly, if a depositor at the third position without
links to preceding depositors decides to withdraw, then she does not know whether she will receive c1 or
crun.
We de￿ne a bank run in the following way.
De￿nition 1 A bank run occurs if at least one patient depositor withdraws.
We present in the following proposition a full characterization of the possible networks under study. We
use iterated deletion of dominated strategies to show that a link connecting the ￿rst and the second depositor
is su¢ cient to avoid bank runs, while they may occur in any other network.
Proposition 1 If the link 12 exists, no bank run is the unique equilibrium. In any network in which the
link 12 does not exist, bank runs may occur.
Proof. Recall that the impatient depositor always withdraws.
First we show that waiting is a dominant strategy for a patient depositor in the third position. Her
decision may follow either two withdrawals (Y￿3 = f1;1g) or a waiting and a withdrawal (Y￿3 = f1;0g). In
6Given the nature of bank runs it seems reasonable to assume that depositors do not know exactly what other depositors
know. However, the theoretical result also holds when network structure is common knowledge.
7the ￿rst (second) case, by waiting she receives c01 (c00), while withdrawal yields crun (c1). Since c01 > crun
(c00 > c1) waiting is a dominant strategy.
Now, suppose that the link 12 is in place. If a patient depositor in the second position observes a waiting,
her dominant strategy is to wait (c00 > c01). Given the previous results, a patient depositor in the ￿rst
position, waits. This follows after noting that this depositor gets the highest payo⁄ by waiting (c00 > c1).
Optimality requires that the second depositor should believe that withdrawals are due to the impatient
depositor with probability 1. As a consequence, if the second depositor observes a withdrawal it is optimal
to wait (c00 > c1). Therefore, the second depositor waits regardless of what she observes. This proves the
￿rst part of the proposition.
The second part of the proposition assumes that link 12 does not exist. We show multiplicity by con-
structing a non bank run and a bank run equilibrium.
A pro￿le of strategies where patient depositors wait always in any position is a no bank run equilibrium.
Recall that a patient in the third position waits. If the strategy of the second (￿rst) depositor when patient
is to wait, then the best response of the ￿rst (second) depositor is also to wait (c00 > c01). Therefore for the
patient depositors "waiting at any position" de￿nes an equilibrium.
In the bank run equilibrium, consider the pro￿le of strategies where depositors 1 and 2 withdraw if patient.
Note that if depositor 1 (depositor 2) withdraws if patient, the best response of depositor 2 (depositor 1) is
also to withdraw if u(c1) > 1
2 [u(c00) + u(c01)] is satis￿ed, since Bayesian updating requires that depositor
2 (depositor 1) believes that depositor 1 (depositor 2) is patient or impatient with probability 1
2. Thus if
link 12 is absent, for c1 high enough, there exist a bank run equilibrium. As a result, there are multiple
equilibria.
Discussion of the Result
Our theoretical result is based on the fact that depositors know their position in the line.7 The proposition
then uses iterated deletion of dominated strategies to show that the existence of the link 12 is important to
avoid bank runs in equilibrium. The result also implies that once the link 12 exists, the links 13 and 23 are
irrelevant. It does not imply, however, that in the absence of the link 12 bank runs always occur. In that
case, depositors 1 and 2 may withdraw or wait in equilibrium.
The proof of the proposition relies on depositors￿optimal beliefs. Speci￿cally, it uses that in the presence
7Kiss and Rosa-Garc￿a (2008) show that if agents do not know their position in the line of the bank, then bank run is a
possible equilibrium outcome in any network, except in the complete network and in the network {12,13} when the ￿rst agent
is patient.
8of the link 12, after observing a waiting (withdraw) a patient depositor in the second position believes that
the ￿rst one is patient (impatient) with probability 1. On the other hand, if depositors 1 and 2 are not linked,
optimality requires that a depositor in the second (￿rst) position believes that the ￿rst (second) depositor
is patient with probability 1
2, given that each possible liquidity type vector describing positions in the line
is equiprobable. This result allows for a full characterization of the eight possible networks regarding the
possibility of bank runs. In the set of networks comprised by f(12;23;13);(12;23);(12;13);(12)g bank runs
should not occur according to our theoretical prediction. In the rest of the networks, both run and no run
are possible equilibria.
3 Experimental Design and Evidence
Experimental Environment
Two experimental sessions were conducted at the Laboratory of Theoretical and Experimental Economics
(LaTEx) of the Universidad de Alicante. A total of 48 students (24 per session) were recruited among the
undergraduate population of the University using Campus Virtual (students￿virtual access to their scholar
information). Through the di⁄erent sessions, students were received and invited to take a numbered ball
to determine their place in the lab. The laboratory consists of 24 computers in separate cubicles. When
subjects were in front of their computers, instructions were read aloud. As usual, any communication during
the experiment was strictly forbidden.
The computerized experiment used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects played a one-shot coordination
problem during 18 rounds, with variation of information and matching across rounds. The ￿rst three rounds
in each session were used for subjects to get familiar with the software and the experimental procedure.
Participants knew that the ￿rst 3 rounds were not going to be paid at the end of the experiments but the
remaining 15 were. We let subjects ask about any doubt after the ￿rst three rounds. The average duration
of each session was 45 minutes.
Subjects were divided into two matching groups of 12 people so subjects from di⁄erent matching groups
never interacted with each other. We randomly and anonymously matched in pairs subjects in the same
matching group. We formed 12 di⁄erent banks at the beginning of each round (each of them with 2 subjects
in the room). The initial endowment of the depositors (e = 40 pesetas) was deposited in a common bank. In
addition, 40 pesetas were invested by a third depositor simulated by the computer.8 Then, each participant
8It is standard practice for all experiments run in Alicante to use Spanish pesetas as experimental currency. The reason for
this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates integer problems, compared with other currencies (USD or euros, for example).
9had to choose between withdrawing her money or to wait. At the end of each round, subjects were informed
about their payo⁄s but not about other depositor￿ s action. In addition, participants were always presented
a di⁄erent situation to avoid learning (i.e., in each round, subjects were placed in a di⁄erent network or in
a di⁄erent position of the same network). In each possible network, the computer-depositor was intended
to embody the impatient depositor so it was programmed to withdraw always her money regardless of the
situation. Subjects knew about the computer as the third depositor in their bank that always withdraws.
They were also informed about the independence of liquidity types and positions in the line. Therefore, the
coordination problem arises in the spirit of our theoretical model above so if depositors in the lab coordinate
on waiting, they get higher payo⁄s than if they do not.
Subjects were provided a payo⁄ table which speci￿ed their payo⁄ in each possible history. To introduce
the network structure in an easy-handle way, participants were told that they were in a given position in the
line of a three-depositor bank and might have information concerning predecessors￿choice and if their action
is going to be observed by someone else in the line. Thus, the problem was sequential and, at the time of
making their decision, experimental subjects were presented local information about the network structure
in the round. This information was summarized in a picture and a short text message that speci￿ed the
available information and the possible payo⁄consequences of both actions, waiting and withdrawing. Within
rounds, subjects in the same bank decided one after the other, so, for instance, the third player in the line
had to wait until the other two depositors (the other player and the computer) have decided. Subjects knew
that the graph and the information changed at every round so it was important for them to consider the
cases carefully.
Payo⁄s
The bank was provided a total of 120 pesetas per round and the contract was given by ￿ = (c00;c1;c01;crun) =
(70;50;30;20). We justi￿ed these payo⁄s as follows.9
The initial endowment e = 40 pesetas was invested at t = 0 in a project that yielded a high long-term
return. The computer was an impatient depositor that needed her funds so she was programmed to withdraw
her money at t = 1, taking ci
1 2 fc1;crung where c1 = 50 pesetas and crun = 20 pesetas. The ￿rst amount
(c1 = 50 pesetas) was received unless there had been already two withdrawals and corresponds to the initial
On the other hand, although Spanish pesetas are no longer in use (replaced by the euro in 2002), Spanish people still use pesetas
to express monetary values in their everyday life. In this respect, by using a "real" (as opposed to an arti￿cial) currency, we
avoid the problem of framing the incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g., "experimental currency") with no
cognitive content. Exchange rate: 1 euro = 166,386 pesetas.
9The payo⁄s resemble the ex ante optimal contract in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), satisfying the relation in (1).
10deposit (e = 40) plus the interest rate (10 pesetas). If the computer was the third withdrawing depositor,
then its payo⁄ was c3
1 = crun = 20 pesetas which corresponds to the initial endowment minus twice the
amount paid to withdrawing depositors (i.e., crun = 3e ￿ 2c1).
If both subjects in the lab coordinated on waiting, the project was carried out by the bank and each
of the subjects who waited received ci
0 = c00 = 70 pesetas. This amount was received after doubling the
available funds at t = 1 (3e￿c1) and then dividing it equally among patient subjects. Withdrawal, however,
was also possible for subjects in the lab. Actually, if only one of the subjects in the lab decided to withdraw,
she would face exactly the same situation as the impatient depositor (computer) taking ci
0 = c1 = 50 pesetas,
regardless of her position. If only one patient subject decides to wait, then the available money after the
two withdrawals (20 pesetas) was incremented by 10 pesetas, and then given to the patient subject that is
c01 = 30 pesetas.
Finally, the position in the line is important when both subjects in the lab withdraw. Since the initial
investment is 120 pesetas and withdrawal would imply 50 pesetas for each subject, the last subject in the
line cannot receive 50 pesetas and will get crun = 20.
The payo⁄ table in Figure 2 replicates the one that subjects had in the instructions and summarizes our
payo⁄ scheme:
During the ￿rst three rounds, subjects were informed about how to read the table. For instance, the
payo⁄ 30 in the ￿rst row and the last column tells that although there have not been any withdrawal yet,
the ￿rst subject in the line may end up obtaining 30 pesetas. As commented above, this occurs if she is the
only subject who waits regardless of her position in the line.
Experimental Results
We report the descriptive statistics in Table 1. We specify in each cell the number of observations (in
brackets) and the observed probability of subject i￿ s withdrawal. The results are presented for each possible
11network structure and for each possible position i 2 f1;2;3g in the line of the bank. We have 720 observations
in total (12 banks x 2 patient subjects x 15 rounds x 2 sessions).
We observe in Table 1 that the existence of the link 12 is important for the ￿rst depositor. In fact, when
the link 12 exists, the probability of depositor 1￿ s withdrawal is at most 20% (Network 2). Contrariwise,
if such a link is not present, the highest probability of withdrawal occurs in the network 5, in which the
￿rst depositor￿ s action is unobservable by any other depositor. The probability of withdrawal in that case
increases up to nearly 60% of the times. To carry out a t-test, we group the networks into two categories
depending on the existence of the link 12. We reject the hypothesis that depositor 1 withdraws with the
same probability when the link 12 exists and when it does not (t = ￿3:8964, p ￿ value = 0:0001).
The evidence, however, is not so clear for depositor 2 who seems to withdraw around one third of the
times regardless of the existence of the link 12. Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that depositor
2￿ s probability of withdrawal is the same when the link 12 is present and when it is not (t = ￿1:5862,
p ￿ value = 0:1140). Thereby, we can conclude that the link 12 a⁄ects di⁄erently the ￿rst and the second
12depositor. Whereas the ￿rst depositor seems to act in line with the theoretical predictions, it is not the case
for the second depositor.
We estimate a probit and a logit model to study in detail the depositors￿behavior. Recall that yi 2 f0;1g
for i = 1;2;3 denotes the decision of depositor i, where 0 denotes keeping the money, whereas 1 indicates
withdrawal. We propose the following speci￿cation that accounts for all possible information that depositor
1 might have when taking her decision:
Pr(y1 = 1) = z(￿0 + ￿1L12 + ￿2L13 + ￿3L12L13) (2)
where z(z) = ez=(1 + ez) in the logistic speci￿cation, whereas z(z) = ￿(z) in the probit model in
which ￿(￿) is the cumulative distribution for the standard normal. Then, the equation (2) states that the
probability of withdrawal for depositor 1, Pr(y1 = 1); may depend on the existence of the link 12 and 13.
The explanatory variable Lij is then de￿ned as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 (0) when the link ij
is (not) present for i;j 2 f1;2;3g, i < j. As a result, L12L13 is obtained as the product of the two dummy
variables L12 and L13. This variable stands for the cases in which both links are present (networks 2 and 7)
and introduces ￿ exibility in the model because it allows to determine whether there is some additional e⁄ect
of having both links, apart from the e⁄ect that the links generate separately.
We run the probit and the logit model in (2) over 238 observations. We present the main results in Table
2. The estimated standard errors of the parameters (SE) take into account the matching group clustering.
All the coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 except ￿3. The marginal e⁄ects reveal that the
probability of withdrawal depends negatively on the existence of the links 12 and 13. In fact, the link
12 signi￿cantly decreases the probability of withdrawal for depositor 1 around 20% whereas the link 13
decreases this probability in 10%. This suggests that what is really important for depositor 1 is the fact of
being observed rather than the existence of the link 12. Indeed, if we test the hypothesis that the link 12 has
the same impact that the link 13 in reducing the probability of depositor 1￿ s withdrawal (i.e., H0 : ￿1 = ￿2);
we cannot reject that hypothesis at any common signi￿cance level (￿2
1 = 1:01; p-value=0:3141).
13In order to analyze the second depositor￿ s behavior, we de￿ne the dummy variable Y 11 (Y 10) which takes
the value 1 when she observes withdrawal (waiting) and is zero otherwise. Thus, if there is no link between
the ￿rst and the second depositor, we will have Y 11 = Y 10 = 0. The explanatory variable L23 stands for
the existence of the link 23. The variable Y 11L23 combines information about what player 2 observes and
whether she is observed. It takes the value 1 if she observes a withdrawal and has a link with the last player
in the line.10 Thus, we propose to model the second depositor￿ s choice as follows:
Pr(y2 = 1) = z(￿0 + ￿1Y 11 + ￿2Y 10 + ￿3L23 + ￿4Y 11L23) (3)
where z(￿) is de￿ned as above. In Table 3 we present the main results. We run the regression (3) over
205 observations, taking into account the matching group clustering.
Recall that our theoretical model predicts that the link 12 is important. The results in Table 3 provide
evidence to support the prediction that the link 12 changes the probability of withdrawal of depositor 2
given that we reject the null hypothesis H0 : ￿1 = ￿2 = 0 at any common signi￿cance level (￿2
1 = 63:00;
p-value=0:0000). The theoretical prediction, however, states that no matter what depositor 2 observes, she
must always wait. In particular, she should identify the withdrawal with the impatient depositor￿ s action.
We test H0 : ￿1 = ￿2 to con￿rm that observing withdrawal or waiting is equally important for depositor
2. We reject that hypothesis at any common signi￿cance level (￿2
1 = 10:30; p-value=0:0013): One way to
interpret the results is that depositor 2 does not take into account the existence of the link 12 but bases her
decision on what she observes. The marginal e⁄ects in Table 3 show that a withdrawal signi￿cantly increases
her probability of withdrawal by 20%, while observing waiting signi￿cantly decreases this probability by
32%. Moreover, the existence of the link 23 does not seem to be important in a⁄ecting depositor 2￿ s choice.
10The explanatory variable Y 10L23 = Y 10 ￿ L23 predicts failure perfectly. This implies that when agent 2 observes waiting
and is linked with agent 3, she always waits. We do not use these 36 observations.
14In short, this implies that regardless of whether her decision is being observed or not, the depositor 2 ￿nds
optimal to withdraw and ensures 50 pesetas after observing a withdrawal. This ￿nding contradicts the
theoretical prediction that states that depositor 2 should deduce that ￿rst depositor￿ s withdrawal was due
to impatient depositor (computer) and thereby she should wait.
Bayesian Analysis
While the theoretical analysis pinpoints that the existence of the link 12 is su¢ cient to eliminate bank runs,
the experimental ￿ndings are not so clear-cut. The ￿rst depositor values being connected as both link 12
and 13 are signi￿cant and decrease the probability of withdrawal. The fact that the marginal e⁄ect of the
link 12 is higher suggests the partial validity of the theoretical result. The evidence is not so clear for the
second depositor. Her decision is highly in￿ uenced by what she observes. Theoretically, it should not be
the case: the second depositor should think that a withdrawal in the ￿rst position was due to the impatient
depositor and therefore she should always wait. If she does not, it is because she attributes some chance to
the possibility that the ￿rst player was the patient depositor. We undertake a Bayesian approach to elicit
the second depositor￿ s beliefs upon observing a withdrawal.
We denote Yi = (y1
i ;:::yl
i;:::yn
i ) the set of depositor i￿ s action, for i = 1;2;3. Slightly abusing notation, we
de￿ne ^ Y2 = (yl
2 2 Y2 j yl
1 = 1;L12 = 1); ^ Y2 ￿ Y2 as the collection of patient depositors in the second position
of the line who have observed a withdrawal. These depositors should decide whether to withdraw (^ yl
2 = 1)
or to wait (^ yl
2 = 0). Since ^ Y2 = (^ y1
2;:::^ yl
2;:::^ yk
2) can be interpreted as k independent random variables, the
probability mass function is given by a binomial distribution, so
Pr(^ Y2j￿) = ￿
w(1 ￿ ￿)k￿w (4)
where w denotes the total number of withdrawals for depositor 2 and ￿ 2 [0;1] denotes the probability
of withdrawal (both conditional on the fact that depositor 2 has observed a withdrawal).
Theoretically, our model predicts that the second depositor should always wait if linked with the ￿rst one
(i.e., ￿ = 0). This follows after reasoning that no withdrawal in the ￿rst position can be due to the patient
depositor. Suppose, however, that depositor 2 is "naive" upon observing a withdrawal. We interpret na￿vetØ
as random behavior but we can also consider it as if with probability 1
2 the second depositor thought that
the impatient depositor (i.e., the computer) had withdrawn, while with probability 1
2 she thought that the
withdrawal was due to the patient depositor. Both cases lead to withdrawal with ￿ = 1
2:
Our objective now is to test whether the second depositor￿ s behavior can be better explained by the
theoretical prediction (hereafter, ￿1) or by the naive behavior (hereafter, ￿2). Recall that it follows from




where the expression above relates the posterior distribution Pr(￿ij^ Y2) to the likelihood function Pr(^ Y2j￿i),
the prior Pr(￿i) and the marginal distribution of the data Pr(^ Y2): In principle, Pr(^ Y2) does not involve ￿i
and the posterior Pr(￿ij^ Y2) is proportional to Pr(^ Y2j￿i) Pr(￿i): Moreover, this posterior density can be
interpreted as the probability of ￿i being true after the evidence in the data. The likelihood Pr(^ Y2j￿i) can be
obtained by using the data and evaluating the probability mass function. We therefore replace k = 65 and
w = 30 in equation (4). We plot the likelihood function Pr(^ Y2j￿i) in Figure 3. The maximum is located at
￿ML = w=k = 30=65 ’ 0:46: This implies that after observing a withdrawal, the second depositor withdraws
with probability 0:46 on average.
In principle, we need to account for the prior Pr(￿i) distribution to obtain the posterior Pr(￿ij^ Y2). We
choose a natural conjugate prior which is proportional to ￿
￿￿1(1￿￿)￿￿1 and leads to a posterior distribution
in the same Beta family.11 We perform our analysis specifying two di⁄erent priors which correspond to our
plausible models described above. Thus, we ￿rst consider the case of ￿ = 1 and ￿ = k + 1 = 66: This prior
distribution is represented on the left-hand side of Figure 4 and corresponds to the prior Pr(￿) = (1￿￿)66 and
therefore, to the theoretical prediction of no withdrawal (Model 1). On the other hand, the naive distribution
considers ￿ = ￿ = k+1
2 = 33 and leads to Pr(￿) = ￿
33(1 ￿ ￿)33 so that it centers around ￿ = 1=2 (Model 2).
11In particular, the posterior distribution Pr(￿ij^ Y2) is a Beta(w + ￿ + 1;k + ￿ ￿ w + 1). Importantly, we do not consider
hierarchical priors that allow for di⁄erent responses (for instance, depending on the existence of the link 23). We do so because
the link 23 is not important once the link 12 is in place. This theoretical result is also consistent with our experimental evidence
in Table 3.
16We also plot the posterior distribution Pr(￿ij^ Y2) on the right-hand-side of Figure 4.12 We are interested
in choosing the more appropriate model to explain the second depositor￿ s behavior so we use the Bayes
Factor. Consider that both models (prior distributions) are equally likely to explain our data, i.e., Pr(￿1) =
Pr(￿2) = 1
2: The Bayes Factor compares how well both hypotheses predict the data. We then test the null
hypothesis that the theoretical prediction (Model 1) explains the data ^ Y2 against the alternative of random
choices (Model 2). Since BF12 ￿
Pr(^ Y2j￿1)
Pr(^ Y2j￿2) = 8:3265
5:2494 10￿6 = 1:5862 106 > 10; the evidence against the null is
decisive (Kass and Raftery, 1995). This reveals that naive behavior is more likely to explain the data than
the probabilities provided by the theory.
4 Conclusion
An important issue regarding the emergence of bank runs is what kind of information depositors have about
the bank and about other depositors￿decision. Existing theoretical models impose information structures
that rely on a simultaneous-move game. We generalize the information structure and suppose that an
underlying social network channels the information among depositors. This modeling choice allows for
incorporating both simultaneous and sequential decisions in the same framework and conform to the empirical
evidence.
We derive a theoretical prediction about depositors￿behavior in a tractable environment that resembles
a classic bank-run setup. We ￿nd that no bank run emerges as unique equilibrium in any setup in which the
￿rst two depositors to decide are connected. This pinpoints the importance of links enabling information
12This distribution has not been normalized to report the probability of ￿i being true given our data but we can obtain the
result by integrating the probability to be one.
17￿ ow among the depositors at the beginning of the sequence and contribute to the debate on the possibility
of unique versus multiple equilibria in bank runs models.
We design a laboratory experiment to test the theoretical prediction. We ￿nd that the ￿rst subject￿ s
behavior is in￿ uenced by the link 12, as predicted by the theory. Nevertheless, the existence of the same link
does not really a⁄ect the second depositor￿ s choices, who instead focuses on the information transmitted by
this link. More speci￿cally, observing a waiting decreases considerably the probability that she withdraws.
If a withdrawal is observed, the opposite happens. On average, these results suggest that the same subject
who is waiting in the ￿rst position, withdraws in the second position if observing a withdrawal. This ￿nding
is puzzling both in face of the theoretical result and individual consistency. Indeed, Bayesian analysis shows
that when the second depositor is patient and observes a withdrawal, she seems to behave randomly.
Moving beyond our speci￿c setup, our interpretation is twofold. On the one hand, links can be e¢ ciently
used for signaling purposes. On the other hand, if the information transmitted by the link is not unambiguous,
then being connected may lead to worse outcomes than the absence of a link. Thereby, although our analysis
is cast in classic terms of bank runs, it also sheds light on the potential weaknesses of other ￿nancial
institutions like mutual or hedge funds. Indeed, any institution performing the maturity transformation of
investing short-term liabilities in long-term assets faces the problem of being run. Whenever investors are
able to withdraw funds with relative ease, a run arises when they do it en masse. Some of these institutions
have a reduced number of investors (like hedge funds) which renders our simple setup more applicable to
them. Our analysis highlights the importance of designing proper mechanisms governing the information
￿ ow among investors in these institutions.
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